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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Roy Roland Araiza appeals from his judgment of conviction for possession 
of methamphetamine. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
The state charged Araiza with one count of possession of 
methamphetamine and another count for possession of oxycodone, with an 
enhancement for being a persistent violator. (R., pp. 49-50, 86-88.) Araiza 
moved to suppress evidence found in a search of his car. (R., pp. 76-77.) 
Following an evidentiary hearing, the court found the relevant facts as follows: 
On the late evening of January 13, 2013, and into the early 
morning hours of January 14, 2013, the defendant was stopped on 
suspicion of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of 
alcohol. 1 Officer Kevin Loosli responded with his drug dog. 
However, prior to running his dog around the car and while Araiza 
was performing field sobriety tests with another officer, Officer 
Loosli noticed a yellow pill imprinted with the number "230" on the 
driver's seat. 
Officer Loosli testified that, in his experience as a police 
officer, the pill resembled a prescription pill and not an over-the-
counter pill. Officer Loosli also testified that people who have 
prescriptions generally keep their pills in the prescription bottle 
while those individuals who possess prescription pills illegally 
generally do not. Based on Officer Loosli's belief that the pill was in 
Araiza's possession illegally, he retrieved the pill without asking 
permission from Araiza. The pill was confirmed to be Oxycodone by 
a drug identification search on the Internet. Araiza never produced 
a prescription for the pill. 
Law enforcement then searched the vehicle and found 
methamphetamine. Araiza has been charged with possession of 
both the pill and the methamphetamine. 
1 
During the hearing on the present motion, Araiza's parole 
officer, Leslie Homer, testified that as of the time of this incident, 
Araiza was on parole and had agreed to certain conditions, 
including: 
The defendant shall consent to the search of his/her 
person, residence, vehicle, personal property, and 
other real property or structures owned or leased by 
the defendant or for which the defendant is the 
controlling authority conducted by any agent of the 
Idaho Dept of Correction or law enforcement officer. 
The defendant waives his/her Fourth Amendment 
Rights concerning searches. 
The traffic stop was not challenged and therefore will not be 
discussed here. 
{R., pp. 140-41.) The district court upheld the search on two bases. First, it 
concluded that Araiza had consented to searches and waived his rights under 
the Fourth Amendment as part of his parole. (R., pp. 142-49.) Second, it 
concluded that seeing the loose pill in plain sight provided probable cause for a 
search under the automobile exception. (R., pp. 150-55.) 
Araiza conditionally pied guilty to possession of methamphetamine, 
preserving his right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion, and the state 
dismissed the other count and the enhancement. (R., pp. 232, 243-44, 246.) 
Araiza timely appealed from entry of judgment. (R., pp. 262-70.) 
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ISSUE 
Araiza states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Araiza's motion 
to suppress? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 3.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Araiza failed to show that he, as a parolee, retained a privacy right 
that was infringed by officers when they searched his car? 
3 
ARGUMENT 
Araiza Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred When It Concluded 
Araiza Failed To Show Any Unconstitutional Intrusion Upon His Privacy 
A. Introduction 
It is undisputed that Araiza was on parole at the time of the search, and 
that as a condition of that parole he had agreed that he "shall consent to the 
search" of his vehicle and "waive[d] [his] Fourth Amendment Rights concerning 
searches." (R., p. 141.) The district court concluded the search was within the 
scope of this waiver of privacy rights. (R., pp. 142-49.) Moreover, the search 
was supported by probable cause. (R., pp. 150-55.) Because Araiza has failed 
to show error in the determination that the search did not intrude upon an 
expectation that was reasonable for him to believe he retained on parole, he has 
failed to show error by the district court. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the 
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely 
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts. State v. Diaz, 
144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007). 
C. Garcia Had No Expectation Of Privacy Relative To The Search Because 
Of His Status As A Parolee 
"A person challenging a search has the burden of showing he or she had 
a legitimate expectation of privacy in the item or place to be searched." State v. 
4 
Pruss, 145 Idaho 623, 626, 181 P.3d 1231, 1234 (2008). To meet this burden 
the moving party must demonstrate both "a subjective expectation of privacy in 
the object of the challenged search" and that "society [is] willing to recognize that 
expectation as reasonable." kl 
Parolees and probationers enjoy a reduced expectation of privacy against 
governmental intrusion. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006); United 
States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001). "[P)ersons conditionally released to 
societies have a reduced expectation of privacy, thereby rendering intrusions by 
government authorities 'reasonable' which otherwise would be unreasonable or 
invalid under traditional constitutional concepts." State v. Gawron, 112 Idaho 
841,843,736 P.2d 1295, 1297 (1987). Thus, "the Fourth Amendment does not 
prohibit a police officer from conducting a suspicionless search of a parolee." 
Samson, 547 U.S. at 856. Because Araiza, as a parolee, had no expectation to 
be free from suspicionless searches, he certainly had no expectation to be free 
from the search in this case, which commenced after officers saw, in plain view, 
a pill they suspected was a controlled substance. 
Although parolees do not reasonably expect to be free of suspicionless 
searches, Araiza contends his parole agreement conferred upon him an 
expectation of privacy that was violated in this case. Specifically, on appeal as 
he did below, Araiza contends that his parole agreement conferred upon him a 
reasonable expectation of privacy because it gave him an expectation that 
officers would request to search (a request he was powerless to deny) and 
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reinstated his right to privacy under the state constitution. (Appellant's brief, pp. 
7-13.) Neither of these claims has merit. 
The parole condition applicable to Araiza stated: 
The defendant shall consent to the search of his/her person, 
residence, vehicle, personal property, and other real property or 
structures owned or leased by the defendant or for which the 
defendant is the controlling authority conducted by any agent of the 
Idaho Dept of Correction or law enforcement officer. The defendant 
waives his/her Fourth Amendment Rights concerning searches. 
(R., p. 141; see also Exhibit 2.) No construction of this language leads to the 
conclusion that it bestowed upon Araiza a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
his car at the time of the search. Rather, it makes clear that Araiza had no 
expectation that officers would not search his car, especially after seeing a loose 
pill they suspected was a controlled substance. 
Araiza contends that the language "shall consent" "requires Mr. Araiza to 
consent in the future." (Appellant's brief, p. 10.) Because he signed the 
agreement prior to the search this is exactly what happened. Araiza had no 
expectation that a condition that he "shall consent" to a search of his car granted 
him privacy rights in the car. Araiza next argues that the requirement of future 
consent implies a requirement of a future request. (Appellant's brief, pp. 10-11.) 
This argument is without merit because there is no requirement of a request, 
implied or otherwise, in the language of the parole agreement. Even if Araiza 
had an expectation of a request, he had no ability to decline it, and so still had no 
reasonable expectation that officers would not search his car. This language 
conferred no reasonable expectation of privacy in the car. 
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Next Araiza argues that because the search term of the parole agreement 
references only the Fourth Amendment it restored his privacy expectations under 
Article I, § 17, of the Idaho constitution. (Appellant's brief, pp. 10-11.) "The 
guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure under [Article I, § 17] is 
substantially the same as the Fourth Amendment." State v. Fees, 140 Idaho 81, 
88, 90 P.3d 306, 313 (2004). Waiver of the rights granted by the Fourth 
Amendment is therefore necessarily a waiver of the same rights granted by 
Article I,§ 17, with certain irrelevant exceptions. JsL at 88-89, 90 P.3d 313-314 
(listing limited areas where Article I, § 17 has been interpreted more broadly than 
the Fourth Amendment). Garcia's argument that failure to mention Article I, § 17 
completely nullified the search term of his probation agreement, such that he 
enjoyed the same expectation of privacy as any other resident of Idaho, is 
meritless. There is no reasonable expectation of privacy created by the terms of 
the parole agreement. Therefore, the search was constitutionally reasonable. 
D. The Search Was Justified By Reasonable Suspicion 
A search of premises controlled by a probationer is reasonable if there is 
reasonable suspicion of a violation of the terms of probation, regardless of the 
scope of any waiver of search rights as a condition of probation. United States v. 
Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 121 (2001 ); State v. Klingler, 143 Idaho 494, 496-98, 148 
P.3d 1240, 1242-44 (2006). As a parolee, Araiza did not enjoy greater rights. 
Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006). In this case officers saw a pill they 
suspected was a controlled substance in Araiza's car. Because this provided 
reasonable suspicion of a parole violation, the search was constitutionally valid. 
7 
Araiza argues that the officers lacked probable cause to search the car 
"because the pill's connection to illegal activity was not immediately apparent." 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 6-7.) As set forth above, because of Araiza's status as a 
parolee the search was justified by reasonable suspicion, a standard less than 
probable cause. To the extent probable cause might be required to justify the 
search, the district court correctly stated the law and analysis for searching a car 
under the automobile exception, applicable regardless of the suspect's parole 
status. The state hereby adopts the district court's legal analysis. (R., pp. 139-
57 (attached as an appendix).) Araiza has failed to show error. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of 
conviction. 
DATED this 16th day of Decemb 
KENNETH K. JORGENSfN 
Deputy Attorney General ' 
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Case No. CR 2013-374 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
MEMORANDUM DECISION, 
AND ORDER RE: 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS 
TI-IIS MA TIER is before the court on the motion of defendant, Roy Roland 
Araiza, Sr., to suppress evidence obtained in this matter. The motion was heard on May 
14, 2013. The state of Idaho was represented at the hearing by Peter Hatch, Deputy 
Prosecuting Attorney for Twin Falls County. Roy Roland Araiza, Sr. was present and 
represented by Keith Roark. The court heard testimony and arguments, and has 
reviewed the motion and applicable law. Based thereon, the court hereby DENIES 
Araiza' s Motion to Suppress. 
MEMORANDUM DECTSION AND ORDER 1 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
On the late evening of January 13, 2013, and into the early morning hours of 
January 14, 2013, the defendant was stopped on suspicion of operating a motor vehicle 
while under the influence of alcohol.1 Officer Kevin Loosli responded with his drug 
dog. However, prior to running his dog around the car and while Araiza was 
performing field sobriety tests with another officer, Officer Loosli noticed a yellow pill 
imprinted with the number "230" on the driver's seat. 
Officer Loosli testified that, in his experience as a police officer, the pill 
resembled a prescription pill and not an over-the-counter pill. Officer Loosli also 
testified that people who have prescriptions generally keep their pills in the 
prescription bottle while those individuals who possess prescription pills illegally 
generally do not. Based on Officer Loosli's belief that the pill was in Araiza's possession 
illegally, he retrieved the pill without asking permission from Araiza. The pill was 
confirmed to be Oxycodone by a drug identification search on the Internet. Araiza 
never produced a prescription for the pill. 
Law enforcement then searched the vehicle and found methamphetamine. 
Araiza has been charged with possession of both the pill and the methamphetamine. 
1 The traffic stop was not challenged and therefore will not be discussed here. 
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During the hearing on the present motion, Araiza' s parole officer, Leslie Homer, 
testified that as of the time of this incident, Araiza was on parole and had agreed to 
certain conditions, including: 
The defendant shall consent to the search of his/her person, 
residence, vehicle, personal property, and other real 
property or structures owned or leased by the defendant or 
for which the defendant is the controlling authority 
conducted by any agent of the Idaho Dept of Correction or 
law enforcement officer. The defendant waives his/her 
Fourth Amendment Rights concerning searches. 
Araiza filed a Motion to Suppress claiming that the search was done without 
probable cause or a valid consent/waiver. 
APPLICABLE LAW 
Both Article 1, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution and the Fourth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution require that all searches and seizures be reasonable. A 
warrantless search is unreasonable unless it falls into an exception to the warrant 
requirement. State v. Cruz, 144 Idaho 906, 908, 174 P.3d 876, 878 (Ct. App. 2007). 
"Under the automobile exception, police may search an automobile and the containers 
within it when they have probable cause to believe that the automobile contains 
contraband or evidence of a crime." State v. Gibson, 141 Idaho 277,281, 108 P.3d 424,429 
(Ct. App. 2005). Additionally, an officer may retrieve items that are in plain view in an 
automobile if he has probable cause to believe the items are contraband or evidence of a 
crime. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 741-42 (1983). 
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These rights are diminished for persons on probation or parole. "[P]ersons 
conditionally released to societies have a reduced expectation of privacy, thereby 
rendering intrusions by government authorities 'reasonable' which otherwise would be 
unreasonable or invalid under traditional constitutional concepts." State v. Purdum, 147 
Idaho 206,209,207 P.3d 182, 185 (2009). However, "[c]onditions of probation, especially 
a waiver of a Fourth Amendment right, cannot be implied." State v. Klingler, 143 Idaho 
494, 496, 148 P.3d 1240, 1242 (2006). 
ANALYSIS 
The state provides two reasons to justify the warrantless search of the vehicle in 
this case. First, the state argues that Araiza had consented to and/or waived his rights 
concerning searches as part of his conditions of parole. Second, the state argues that the 
search was justified by probable cause. 
A. Consent/Waiver. 
1. The defendant has consented to all searches. 
The state argues that Araiza waived his right to challenge the search as part of 
his conditions of parole. The specific condition stated: 
The defendant shall consent to the search of his/her person, 
residence, vehicle, personal property, and other real 
property or structures owned or leased by the defendant or 
for which the defendant is the controlling authority 
conducted by any agent of the Idaho Dept of Correction or 
law enforcement officer. The defendant waives his/her 
Fourth Amendment Rights concerning searches. 
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~------- --------------------·------------·-·-····· ·-··· 
The state argues that even if the beginning of the condition implies Araiza would 
consent only if asked by an officer, the second sentence indicates that an officer need 
not ask permission since Araiza waived his rights to government searches generally. 
Araiza counters, arguing that while a defendant may generally waive his or her 
right to be free from searches, his special condition of probation did not do so and that 
the second sentence is ambiguous and does not waive his right to be free from searches 
under the Idaho Constitution. 
Araiza cites to two cases in his argument. In State v. Gawron, the Idaho Supreme 
Court held that an advanced waiver on searches was valid.112 Idaho 841,843,736 P.2d 
1295, 1297 (1987). In that case, the specific waiver stated: 
That probationer does hereby agree and consent to the 
search of his person, automobile, real property, and any 
other property at any time and at any place by any law 
enforcement officer, peace officer, or probation officer, and 
does waive his constitutional right to be free from such 
searches. 
Araiza contrasts that decision and condition with another case, State v. Turek, 150 
Idaho 745, 749, 250 P.3d 796, 800, (Ct. App. 2011). In Turek, the Idaho Court of Appeals 
examined a similar condition, but ruled that it was not a complete waiver of all Fourth 
Amendment rights. In that case, the specific waiver stated that the defendant was 
required to: 
[ s ]ubmit to searches of his/her person, residence, and any 
property under his/her control, without a warrant pursuant 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 5 
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to probation supervision, at the request of the Probation 
Officer or Law Enforcement. 
Id. at 746,250 P.3d at 797. The Court ruled that, although the defendant agreed to 
submit to searches as part of his probation, the searches still had to be preceded by a 
request from law enforcement. 
Araiza claims the special condition in his case is more akin to the special 
condition in Turek. He argues that the waiver in Gawron was automatic because the 
phrase, "does hereby agree and consent" was a waiver of his Fourth Amendment rights 
at the time of signing, whereas the agreement to II submit to searches" in Turek means 
that the probationer must submit, but only after being requested to do so. As the special 
condition in this case contains the phrase "shall consent to," Araiza claims that a law 
enforcement officer must make a request prior to the search in order to trigger the 
special condition. This court disagrees with Araiza. 
While "submit to searches" and "shall consent to" appear to be similar, the Court 
of Appeals did not hinge its decision on that phrase in Turek. Instead, the Court of 
Appeals focused on the prerequisite "at the request of" in making the distinction 
between Turek and Gawron. Id. at 749,250 P.3d at 800. The Court of Appeals concluded 
that II a probation condition that requires a probationer to submit to a search 'at the 
request of' an officer requires that the probationer be informed of an officer's intent to 
conduct an impending search." Id. at 752,250 P.3d at 803. 




The phrase at issue in this case is very similar to the phrase at issue in State v. 
Purdum, 147 Idaho 206,207 P.3d 182 (2009). In that case, an officer who knew the 
defendant was on probation saw Purdum driving and decided to stop him for no other 
reason other than to have him submit to a drug test. Id. at 207,207 P.3d at 183. Purdum 
arrived at a residence and, noticing the officer's presence, took off running. Id. 
Eventually, the officer was able to catch and detain Purdum. Id. A search of Purdum's 
car incident to arrest revealed drugs and drug paraphernalia. Id. Purdum moved to 
suppress that evidence claiming he had been improperly seized and therefore the 
subsequent search was invalid. Id. The state countered, claiming he had waived his 
constitutional right to be free from seizures through a special term of probation. The 
special term of probation stated: 
The Defendant shall submit to random blood, breath and/or 
urine analysis upon the request of the Court, his probation 
officer or any law enforcement official. 
Id. at 210, 207 P.3d at 186. 
The Court reviewed its analysis in Gawron, including the observation that 
"persons conditionally released to societies have a reduced expectation of privacy, 
thereby rendering intrusions by government authorities 'reasonable' which otherwise 
would be unreasonable or invalid under traditional constitutional concepts." Id. at 209, 
207 P.3d at 185. In upholding the officer's actions in relation to the waiver in Purdum, 
the court stated: 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 7 
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Thus, the language of Purdum' s condition of probation is 
very similar to the language of the condition at issue in 
Gawron. That condition used the phrase 'at any time and at 
any place by any law enforcement officer.' Purdum's 
condition of probation constituted a similar express waiver 
of his constitutional right to be free from warrantless 
searches. 
Id. at 210, 207 P.3d at 186. The Court further stated that "Purdum consented to submit 
to random evidentiary testing and, therefore, he impliedly consented to a limited 
seizure of his person necessary to effectuate such searches." Id. 
The Court of Appeals restated the Purdum holding in a subsequent case, stating: 
"that a probationer's waiver requiring him to submit to 'random' [drug testing] upon 
the request of law enforcement personnel, encompassed a waiver of his right to be free 
of suspicionless seizures." State v. Hedgecock, 147 Idaho 580, 584, 212 P.3d 1010, 1014 (Ct. 
App. 2009). 
In this court's view, Araiza' s special condition is most similar to the special 
conditions in Purdum and Gawron. Araiza's condition states that he "shall consent to 
the search," with no mention of an officer's request. Purdum's condition stated that he 
"shall submit to random blood, breath and/or urine analysis upon the request of the 
Court, his probation officer or any law enforcement official." 147 Idaho at 210, 207 P.3d at 
186 (emphasis in original). The Idaho Supreme Court treated that phrase in Purdum as 
an express waiver and consent to a seizure for evidentiary testing even when the officer 
does not actually ask first. Thus, if the phrase "shall submit to ... upon the request" 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 8 
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constitutes an express waiver even when no request is made, then Araiza' s condition 
"shall consent to" is correspondingly an express waiver as to searches. 
In Gawron, the language at issue was that the probationer "does hereby agree and 
consent." While Araiza' s condition does not contain language of an express, immediate 
waiver, the "shall consent to" language, without any condition as to timing, implies that 
Araiza would consent before, during, and even after any searches under that condition. 
There is no prerequisite that an officer actually ask first. 2 
Araiza' s special condition does not fall under Turek. This court notes that the 
language in Purdum (a 2009 Idaho Supreme Court case) contains the phrase, "upon the 
request" that is nearly identical to Turek's (a 2011 Idaho Court of Appeals case) "at the 
request of," which is the phrase the Court of Appeals used to distinguish Turek from 
Gawron (a 1987 Idaho Supreme Court case). Considering that the Court of Appeals' 
distinction between Turek and Gawron could not be drawn between Turek and Purdum, 
the Courts of Appeals' stated distinction between those two cases was that "in Purdum 
the probationer was present at the time of the search." Turek, 150 Idaho at 749,250 P.3d 
at 749. 
2 This concept is supported by Purdum and Hedgecock, above. As the condition in Purdum stated that the defendant 
"shall submit to," there could be an argument that the defendant was required to submit, but did not have to and 
would only be subject to a probation violation ifhe withheld consent. However, the Court held that the "shall submit 
to" language permitted a suspicionless seizure. A suspicionless seizure contemplates a defendant that has not freely 
submitted to the testing as, had he submitted as required by the special condition, there would be no need to "seize" 
him. Therefore, the language and holding in Purdum allowed for a seizure of the defendant, whether or not he is 
asked to submit. In the present case, the phrase "shall consent to" is not even accompanied by "at the request'' or 
''upon the request" as seen in Purdum and ultimately dispositive in Turek. 
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To be clear, the Court of Appeals limited its analysis in Turek to "[wJhether a 
probation condition which requires that a probationer submit to warrantless searches 
'at the request of' [law enforcement] requires that the probationer be notified of the 
search and/or consent at the time of the search ... " Id. The phrase "at the request of" is 
not present in Araiza' s special condition. This court also notes that at no time in the 
Purdum case did the officer request a search or seizure of the probationer. 
Like Purdum, in the present case a request to search Araiza' s car was never made. 
Also like Purdum, Araiza was present when his car was searched-except that he was 
performing field sobriety tests nearby instead of sitting in the back of a patrol vehicle 
like the probationer in Purdum. Therefore, the distinctions that the Court of Appeals 
found in Turek with regard to Gawron and Purdum -pertaining to "upon request" and 
presence and/or notification of a search-do not apply to the present case. 
2. The defendant has waived any right to be free from searches. 
Even if some distinction could be made between the two Idaho Supreme Court 
cases and the case at bar, the second sentence of Araiza' s special condition regarding 
searches permits the search in this case. That sentence states, "[t]he defendant waives 
his/her Fourth Amendment Rights concerning searches." Araiza argues that this phrase 
is ambiguous in that it does not waive the rights to be free from searches provided in 
Article 1 Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution. 
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First, the court notes that the wording of the Fourth Amendment and Article 1 
Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution are nearly identical-with the only differences 
relating to warrants which are not at issue here. The argument that somehow Araiza 
could waive his Fourth Amendment rights and not the identical rights under the Idaho 
Constitution is unavailing and-as both cover the same areas-would mean that the 
Fourth Amendment waiver statement is meaningless if the Idaho rights remain. 
Second, the reference to the "Fourth Amendment," is not ambiguous. In fact, it is 
often used by the Idaho appellate courts to refer generally to the rights contained in that 
Amendment. See generally, Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 207 P.3d 182; and Turek, 150 Idaho 
745,250 P.3d 745. It is commonly accepted that searches under the "Fourth 
Amendment" includes all searches, including those that would otherwise come within 
the purview of the Idaho Constitution. 
Therefore, even if the first sentence of Araiza' s condition does not allow the 
search undertaken in this case, the second sentence would, as Araiza would have 
understood what "Fourth Amendment" rights he would have been giving up as part of 
being paroled when he signed the agreement. 
Araiza' s signed consent to searches acts as a waiver of hls rights to be free from 
searches. Therefore, Araiza cannot challenge the search in this case. 
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B. Probable Cause. 
Although Araiza waived his right to challenge the search in this case, this court 
holds that the search was supported by probable cause in any event. 
"Under the automobile exception [to the Fourth Amendment], police may search 
an automobile and the containers within it when they have probable cause to believe 
that the automobile contains contraband or evidence of a crime." State v. Gibson, 141 
Idaho 277, 281, 108 P.3d 424, 429 (Ct. App. 2005). 
The "plain view'' exception to the warrant requirement has also been applied to 
automobiles. In Texas v. Brown, the Supreme Court held that when an officer views 
items in an automobile that he has probable cause to believe are incriminating, he may 
retrieve those items. 460 U.S. 730, 741-42 (1983). "The seizure of property in plain view 
involves no invasion of privacy and is presumptively reasonable, assuming that there is 
probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity." Id. (quoting Payton v. 
New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587 (1980)). The Court noted that the "immediately apparent" 
criminal nature of the items viewed did not require that the officer "know" that the 
items were contraband or evidence of a crime. Id. at 741. 
Put simply, an officer can retrieve items in plain view in an automobile when he 
has probable cause to believe those items are contraband or evidence of a crime. The 
officer may also search a vehicle under the automobile exception if he has probable 
cause to believe that the automobile contains contraband or evidence of a crime. 
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"Probable cause is a flexible, common-sense standard." Gibson, 141 Idaho at 281, 
108 P .3d at 429. "A practical, nontechnical probability that incriminating evidence is 
present is all that is required." Id. Probable cause "merely requires that the facts 
available to the officer would warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that 
certain items may be contraband ... it does not demand any showing that such a belief 
be correct or more likely true than false." Brown, 460 U.S. at 742. 
In the present case, Officer Loosli looked through the window of the car and 
noticed a yellow pill on the driver's seat. Officer Loosli, through his experience, had 
developed an understanding about how over-the-counter pills appear generally, and 
this yellow pill did not have that appearance. The yellow pill had numbering that, 
according to Officer Loosli, was indicative of a prescription pill. Officer Loosli believed 
that the pill was possessed without a valid prescription because it was not in a 
prescription pill bottle and no prescription bottle was in sight. Officer Loosli testified 
that, based on his experience, when individuals illegally possess prescription pills, the 
pills are loose or in containers that do not have a prescription on them. In contrast, 
when pills are possessed under a prescription, those pills are usually in a prescription 
bottle, or near a prescription bottle. 
This court holds that such observations, coupled with on-the-job experience 
would give a person of reasonable caution a strong assumption that the pill was 
contraband. In so holding, the court likens the situation to that of a drug dog sniff 
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giving rise to probable cause. "When a reliable drug-detection dog indicates that a 
lawfully stopped automobile contains the odor of controlled substances, the officer has 
probable cause to believe that there are drugs in the automobile and may search it 
without a warrant." State v. Gibson, 141 Idaho 277,281, 108 P.3d 424,429 (Ct. App. 2005). 
A drug dog, however, cannot give a positive guarantee that drugs are present as the 
dog is sensing the presence of the odor of drugs and the odor may be remaining from 
drugs having been in the car or the odor of the drugs on some fabric in the car or on the 
occupants of the car. See Florida v. Harris, 133 S.Ct. 1050, 1056-57 (2013) (explaining why 
a drug dog's indication on a car where drugs are not ultimately found may not be an 
error). 
Considering that a drug dog's alert of the presence of the odor of drugs-
whether or not drugs are actually present-in a vehicle is sufficient for probable cause 
to search the vehicle, this court believes that an officer's perception of a loose pill 
appearing to be a prescription pill on the driver's seat provides probable cause that the 
pill is contraband. The officer may be mistaken, but the indicators observed by the 
officer-just like odors of drugs to drug dogs-pomt to the pill being contraband. 
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The pill was in plain view. Officer Loosli had probable cause to believe that it 
was contraband. Under the plain view doctrine, Officer Loosli could legally retrieve the 
ill 3 p . 
After confirming that the pill was a controlled substance, the officers then had 
probable cause to believe that the car contained more contraband and could lawfully 
search the car under the automobile exception. A subsequent search revealed 
methamphetamine. 
Araiza argues that probable cause did not exist because 1) the officer did not 
know for a fact that the pill was a prescription pill when he went to retrieve it and 2) the 
officer did not ask Araiza whether he had a valid prescription before retrieving the pill. 
Both arguments fail. 
As noted above, an officer does not need to "know'' the item is contraband. 
Brown, 460 U.S. at 741. He is only required to have "probable cause to associate the 
property with criminal activity." Id. at 741-42. Such a standard is reflected in drug dog 
sniff cases. As noted above, a drug dog may indicate on an automobile solely because 
drugs were recently, but no longer, present in the automobile. The officer cannot 
3 Whether or not seeing the pill would give probable cause to search the entire vehicle is not an issue here. Generally 
it would be more prudent to retrieve the pill under the plain view doctrine, and examine its nature further. If the pill 
turns out to be a controlled substance, the officer would clearly have probable cause to search the rest of the vehicle 
for more contraband under the automobile exception because the officer could reasonably believe that the 
automobile contained more contraband or evidence of a crime (possession). That is exactly what was done by the 
officers in this case. 
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"know" that there are drugs in the car just because a drug dog indicates and the officer 
is not required to "know" to support probable cause. 
While Officer Loosli could have asked Araiza whether he had a prescription for 
the pill, any answer Araiza would have given would not alter the probable cause 
Officer Loosli already had to retrieve the pill. In essence, there are four answers to such 
a question: 1) Araiza did not have a prescription because the pill was an over-the-
counter pill; 2) he did not know about any pill; 3) he did not have a prescription; or 4) 
he did have a prescription. 
Once probable cause is reached, it is not necessarily undone solely because other 
information is obtained that seems to contradict it. In State v. Anderson, 2012 WL 
4055342, 1 (Idaho Supreme Court), a drug dog indicated on an automobile. The drug 
dog was put inside the automobile and failed to indicate once inside. Id. The Idaho 
Supreme Court ruled that, while the failure to indicate inside the automobile somewhat 
undercut the initial drug dog detection, such a failure did not unravel probable cause 
because other factors supporting probable cause were present. Id. at 5. 
Araiza provided no legal support for the concept that an officer, even when he 
has probable cause, must exhaust all other investigative avenues-such as asking about 
an apparently illegally-possessed controlled substance-before performing a 
warrantless search. This court is unaware of any such legal authority. 
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Here, Officer Loosli observed a loose-apparent prescription pill with no 
indication of a prescription. He then had probable cause to retrieve the pill under the 
plain view doctrine. Officer Loosli could have asked Araiza about the pill, but none of 
the four possible answers would have undone the probable cause. Had Araiza claimed 
it was an over-the-counter pill, probable cause would still be present due to the 
suspicious circumstances and only retrieving the pill would confirm or contradict 
Araiza' s claim. Had Araiza claimed he had a prescription and even produced the 
prescription, the only way to verify the suspicious pill was the drug under that 
prescription would be to retrieve the pill and check it. Had Araiza claimed he did not 
know what the pill was, the officer would still be permitted to retrieve the pill to find 
out if it was, in fact, a controlled substance. Therefore, asking about the pill would 
provide the officer with no real information and have no effect on the probable cause 
that Officer Loosli had already developed based on his observations and experience. 
Officer Loosli had probable cause under the plain view doctrine based on his 
observations and experience to retrieve the loose pill. Once the pill was verified to be a 
controlled substance, the officers had probable cause to search the rest of the vehicle for 
more contraband and/or evidence of a crime. 
CONCLUSION 
Araiza waived his Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable 
searches when he was released on parole. Even had he not, the officers had probable 
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cause to retrieve the pill in question and then conduct the subsequent search. Therefore, 
Araiza's Motion to Suppress is hereby DENIED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED 
Dated This 2 'f-day of May, 2013. 
District Judge 
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l.C.R. 49 (b) 
NOTICE OF ORDER 
I, Shelley Bartlett, Deputy Clerk for the County Twin Falls, do hereby certify that 
on the 21: day of May, 2013, I have caused to be served a true and correct copy of 
the above and foregoing document: MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS, to each of the persons as listed below: 
Peter Hatch 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
P.O. Box 126 
Twin Falls, ID 83303 
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Keith Roark 
409 North Main Street 
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